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Abstract
A central question in the debate surrounding contemporary proposals for a new interna-
tional order is whether accepting the fact of global pluralism should lead us to lower our
ambitions for global justice. Many participants in that debate answer such a question pos-
itively. Even authors such as Rawls and Habermas —both prominent defenders of ambi-
tious conceptions of domestic justice— seem to reach the same pessimistic conclusion
with their respective proposals for a new international order. In this paper, I question the
plausibility of such a conclusion on the basis of an analysis of the cosmopolitan project
that Habermas articulates in recent publications. I argue that his presentation of the pro-
ject oscillates between two models. The first is an ambitious model for a future interna-
tional order geared towards fulfilling the human rights goals of the UN Charter. The sec-
ond is a minimalist model, in which the international community’s obligation to protect
human rights is limited to the negative duty of preventing wars of aggression and massive
human rights violations stemming from armed conflicts such as ethnic cleansing or geno-
cide. According to this model, any more ambitious goals should be left to a global domes-
tic politics, which would have to come about through negotiated compromises among
domesticated major powers at the transnational level. I defend the ambitious model by
arguing that there is no plausible basis for drawing a normatively significant distinction
between massive human rights violations stemming from armed conflicts and those stem-
ming from regulations of the global economic order. If this is correct, acceptance of the
fact of global pluralism does not offer a plausible justification to exclude economic justice
from the principles of transnational justice recognized by the international community.
Keywords: cosmopolitanism; global justice; globalization; Habermas; human rights; over-
lapping consensus; pluralism; Rawls.
Resumen. Pluralismo y justicia global
Una cuestión central en el debate en torno a propuestas contemporáneas para un nuevo
orden internacional es la de si aceptar el hecho del pluralismo global ha de llevarnos a reba-
jar nuestras expectativas de justicia global. Muchos de los participantes en este debate res-
ponden de modo afirmativo a esta pregunta. Incluso autores como Rawls y Habermas
—ambos prominentes defensores de concepciones ambiciosas de justicia doméstica— parecen
llegar a dicha conclusión pesimista en sus respectivas propuestas para un nuevo orden inter-
nacional. En este artículo, cuestiono la plausibilidad de tal conclusión a partir de un aná-
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lisis del proyecto cosmopolita que Habermas ha articulado en publicaciones recientes.
Argumento que su presentación del proyecto oscila entre dos modelos. El primero es un
modelo ambicioso para un futuro orden internacional dirigido a cumplir los objetivos de
derechos humanos contenidos en la Carta de las Naciones Unidas. El segundo es un modelo
minimalista donde el deber de proteger los derechos humanos por parte de la comunidad
internacional está limitado a la obligación negativa de prevenir guerras de agresión y vio-
laciones masivas de los derechos humanos provenientes de conflictos armados como lim-
piezas étnicas o genocidio. Según este modelo, cualquier objetivo de justicia más ambi-
cioso quedaría relegado a una política doméstica global acordada mediante la negociación
de compromisos entre unas grandes potencias domesticadas. En contra de esta interpretación
minimalista y a favor de la interpretación ambiciosa del modelo, argumento que no hay
ninguna base normativa plausible para trazar una distinción significativa entre violaciones
masivas de los derechos humanos debidas a conflictos armados y violaciones debidas a las
regulaciones internacionales del orden económico global. Si esto es cierto, aceptar el hecho
del pluralismo global no ofrece una justificación plausible para excluir la justicia econó-
mica de los principios de justicia transnacional reconocidos por la comunidad internacional.
Palabras clave: cosmopolitanismo; justicia global; globalización; Habermas; derechos huma-
nos; consenso por solapamiento; pluralismo; Rawls.
Towards the end of the Cold War, two seminal works of political philosophy were
published in quick succession: Habermas’s Between Facts and Norms (1992) and
Rawls’s Political Liberalism (1993). Each work set forth its own approach for mak-
ing the demands of justice compatible with respect for pluralism in modern demo-
cratic societies. The idea of an overlapping consensus was at the center of Rawls’s
approach and the ideal of a deliberative democracy at the center of Habermas’s
approach. But, as Hegel had cautioned, so too in this case the proverbial owl of
Minerva was spreading its wings only after dusk had fallen. At the precise his-
torical moment when theoretical solutions began to emerge for making justice
and pluralism compatible with one another on the domestic level of nation states,
the end of the Cold War led to an accelerated process of globalization that has
questioned the viability of any merely domestic solution. Seen from this per-
spective, it is not at all surprising that both authors immediately tried to extend
their respective solutions from the domestic to the global context of an emerg-
ing international order. Rawls undertook such an extension in The Law of Peo-
ples and Habermas has done so in several writings, the most recent of which is
entitled «A political constitution for the pluralist world society?»1 However, the
nature of their proposals has surprised many. The hesitancy of their defenses of
the priority of the right over pluralism among conceptions of the good is strik-
ing —particularly in light of the fact that both have traditionally been adamant
defenders of such a priority. In fact, the preoccupation with respecting global plu-
ralism seems to have seriously undermined their confidence in the extended appli-
cation of their own domestic solutions to the international context.
1. Habermas (2008), 324-366.
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In Rawls’s case, the discontinuity is clear as soon as one pays attention to
the transformation that his conception of an overlapping consensus undergoes
when moving from the domestic to the international context. In the domestic
context, Rawls’s acknowledgement of the fact of pluralism led him to interpret
the consensus on a set of constitutional rights that is characteristic of liberal
democracies as an overlapping consensus. More specifically, it led him to con-
ceive of it as a consensus on a single set of rights open to a variety of underly-
ing justifications which are drawn from the diverse comprehensive doctrines
that different groups of citizens endorse. However, the international consensus
that Rawls proposes in the Law of Peoples is not merely a consensus based on
(potentially) diverse justifications, but a consensus on a different (and less
demanding) set of rights. According to Rawls, the constitutional rights that
Western liberal democracies grant to their own citizens derive from a commit-
ment to liberalism or, as he puts it, they express «liberal aspirations»2 which
cannot be legitimately imposed on other societies once we accept the fact of
global pluralism3. Consequently, the standards of international human rights
must differ and be less demanding than the standards of constitutional rights rec-
ognized in liberal democracies.
Interestingly enough, the international agreement expressed in the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights from 1948 is considered by many to be a
historical example of a Rawlsian overlapping consensus, that is, a consensus
on a single set of international rights that leaves its ultimate justification open
to a diversity of possible interpretations4. However, this point of view is actu-
2. See Rawls (1999), 80, n. 23.
3. This is not one of Rawls’s own expressions. However, in using it, I make reference to the
way in which the domestic fact of reasonable pluralism is paralleled at the global level, as
Rawls himself indicates at the beginning of the Law of Peoples (despite the fact that he does
not coin a catch expression for such a phenomenon). As Rawls indicates, «In the Society
of Peoples, the parallel to reasonable pluralism is the diversity among reasonable peoples
with their different cultures and traditions of thought, both religious and nonreligious»
(Rawls [1999], 11). According to Rawls, acceptance of the fact of reasonable pluralism at
the domestic level is perfectly compatible with holding to one’s liberal aspirations, but this
is not the case at the global level. In light of this, it seems important to use different expres-
sions to indicate that what is involved at the global level is not just acceptance of the same
old fact we thought we had already accepted at home, but something more (acceptance of
the existence of a diversity of «peoples» without a shared political culture, of the impor-
tance of a people’s self-determination, etc.). Needless to say, one may accept Rawls’s account
of one of these facts without accepting the other, as cosmopolitan critics of Rawls’s Law of
Peoples who are domestic liberals typically do.
4. For an example of this interpretation see Beitz (2004). Beitz offers convincing arguments
for a defense of his interpretation of the UDHR as an historical example of a Rawlsian over-
lapping consensus (i.e., a consensus on a single set of rights, which may be justified on highly
divergent grounds). However, he fails to indicate in that context that Rawls’s conception of
human rights in the Law of Peoples not only subscribes to the justificatory minimalism char-
acteristic of the practical view of human rights, but also to a substantive minimalism which
is incompatible with the view taken by the framers of the UDHR regarding the proper con-
tent of human rights.
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ally incompatible with the one that Rawls defends in his Law of Peoples. The
international consensus that Rawls proposes there represents not just a case of
justificatory minimalism, but above all of substantive minimalism5, since it
5. For the distinction between justificatory and substantive minimalism see J. Cohen (2004).
Cohen’s distinction is important and useful. However, the argument he offers in his paper
seems problematic. Cohen introduces the distinction between justificatory and substan-
tive minimalism in order to show that both are logically independent and thus that a defense
of the former does not per se entail a defense of the latter. According to Cohen’s argument,
the precise determination of the content of human rights should be «left open to an inde-
pendent argument about conditions of membership that proceeds on the terrain of global
public reason» (p. 210). The appropriate determination of the content of human rights
should ultimately depend on which argument can win support within different ethical and
religious traditions and this determination, as Cohen explains, may require «fresh elabora-
tion of those traditions by their proponents» in order to «provide that tradition with its
most compelling statement» (p. 201). Since this process has not taken place yet there is no
reason to assume that the justificatory minimalism that it requires will necessarily lead to a
substantive minimalism. However, at the end of the article, Cohen takes a puzzling fur-
ther step and defends the Rawlsian variety of substantive minimalism, according to which
«standards of human rights should differ from and be less demanding than standards that
we endorse for our own society» (ibid.). In making such a claim Cohen seems to directly
undermine his own argument for substantive openness (by ruling out two options as pos-
sible outcomes of the independent argument, namely, that human rights standards could be
coextensive with or even more demanding than domestic standards). Cohen offers a gen-
eral argument from toleration to justify his endorsement of the Rawlsian variant of sub-
stantive minimalism. However, this argument hardly seems compatible with the «princi-
pled» justificatory minimalism that he defends in the article. His argument is as follows:
«The idea of tolerating reasonable differences suggests that the standards to which all polit-
ical societies are to be held accountable will need to be less demanding than the standards of
justice one endorses. This point about toleration does not imply relativism about justice: the
point is not that justice is relative to circumstance… The observation here is simply that,
once we take into consideration the value of toleration, we will be more inclined to accept
differences between what we take to be the correct standards of justice —and the rights
ingredient in those standards— and the human rights standards to which all political soci-
eties are to be held accountable» (p. 212). Now, in order to assess whether this view is com-
patible with «principled» justificatory minimalism, the crucial question that needs to be
determined is what kind of differences one should be inclined to accept and for what rea-
sons. Since Cohen explicitly rejects relativism, his claim cannot mean that one should accept
all those differences that reflect whatever standards other societies happen to endorse, regard-
less of the quality of the reasons behind such support. It must mean that one should accept
only those differences that are supported by good or compelling reasons. Now, this quali-
fication in turn can be understood in a relativistic or in a non-relativistic way: either it
means «compelling reasons for them» or it means compelling reasons period, that is, «com-
pelling reasons for anyone». Whereas the first interpretation amounts to the relativistic
«blank check» that Cohen rejects, the second seems to lead to the conclusion that we ought
to revise our views and recognize that the standards of justice to which we can reasonably
hold others accountable are actually less demanding than we took them to be, and thus
that there is at least prima facie reason to lower our own standards at home to accommodate
those reasonable differences (which in light of the fact of reasonable pluralism are likely to
be present at home as well), precisely because and to the extent that they are reasonable. It
seems that a non-relativist interpretation of toleration leaves us with only two options:
either toleration begins at home or it should not begin at all. In other words, either we
make the answer to the question of «What differences regarding justice are reasonable to
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involves a severe reduction in content and scope of the rights recognized in
the UN Charter6. Although the Rawlsian idea of an overlapping consensus
promises to make the demands of justice compatible with respect for pluralism
in the domestic context, this no longer seems possible in the international con-
text. Accepting Rawls’s proposal implies an acceptance of the fact that global
pluralism imposes severe constraints on demands for global justice.
In the case of Habermas, the situation is more complex, since his propos-
al for a new international order has not been articulated in all its details. On
the one hand, given the markedly procedural character of his discourse model
for deliberative democracy, his proposal cannot be expected to spell out the
exact content of international human rights standards. According to the insti-
tutional design for a new international order that Habermas proposes (and,
in perfect congruence with the domestic case) the determination of specific
principles of transnational justice is itself dependent on an ongoing process of
deliberation by members of the international community in an appropriately
transformed world organization. To the extent that this determination ulti-
mately depends on which arguments turn out to be most convincing through-
out the process of determining what global justice demands of the interna-
tional community, there is no reason to suppose, as Rawls does, that these
standards must be different and less demanding than those recognized by liberal
democracies or by the UN Charter. This cosmopolitan feature of Habermas’s
model suggests that respect for pluralism does not have to lead to a drastic
reduction in aspirations for global justice. In fact, in contrast to Rawls, Haber-
mas considers redistributive measures for the reduction of extreme disparities
in worldwide welfare as a legitimate political goal for the international com-
munity. On the other hand, this is precisely where a clear discontinuity crops
up between the domestic and the international context. Whereas in the domes-
tic case this goal is internally connected to the demands of justice generated
by the constitutional rights of citizens, this connection disappears in the inter-
national context. According to Habermas’s proposal, economic issues must be
separated from the international community’s obligations of justice and inter-
preted as political aspirations that reflect differences in value orientations and
tolerate?» dependent on the quality of the best reasons available in an open-ended dialogue,
in which case we end up with a single standard of reasonable toleration (namely, the one that
tracks the quality of the best reasons available) or we hold on to the claim that the inter-
national standard of toleration ought to be different and less demanding than it is at home,
but then we cannot propose to determine both standards by the single source of the best rea-
sons available in an open-ended dialogue, as Cohen (rightly in my view) does. In that case,
we simply would have decided in advance of any dialogue that «we cannot be both tolerant
and ambitious» in our understanding of what human rights demand, contrary to Cohen’s
own aims.
6. Among the rights included in the UDHR, but excluded from the Ralwsian proposal are
the right to full equality and against discrimination based on race, color, sex, language, reli-
gion, etc. (Article 1 and 2), freedom of expression and association (Article 19 and 20), as well
as political rights to democratic participation (Article 21) or social rights such as the right
to education (Article 26).
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ideals. As such, these issues should be agreed upon through negotiated com-
promises among the conflicting value preferences and interests of the major
transnational powers. In consequence, the aspirations for justice that stem
from applying the deliberative model to those functions that the internation-
al community as a whole is supposed to exercise in a transformed world orga-
nization are drastically undermined through the application of a pluralist model
of negotiation and compromise to those functions ascribed to the major glob-
al players at the transnational level. It seems that the same conclusion is drawn
in Habermas as well, albeit through a different path. Accepting the argument
behind this proposal seems to commit one to accepting that a respect for glob-
al pluralism imposes severe constraints on demands for global justice. That
the authors of two of the most demanding contemporary conceptions of domes-
tic justice reach the same pessimistic conclusion regarding the international
context is certainly disquieting to those who, like me, harbor ambitious aspi-
rations for global justice.
Nonetheless, in what follows I would like to resist this conclusion by crit-
ically inspecting the arguments Habermas offers in defense of his proposal
that, in my opinion, lead to an ultraminimalist interpretation of the interna-
tional community’s obligations of justice. My ultimate intention, however, is
not merely critical. Identifying the weaknesses of these arguments makes it
possible to recuperate other valuable elements within the Habermasian model
that can be used to defend more ambitious obligations of justice in a pluralist
world society. Admittedly, this is something that I will only indicate in clos-
ing, but cannot fully defend here7.
The Habermasian model for a future international order is supposed to
provide an answer to the bold and difficult question of how to conceive a
global domestic politics without world government. This task already reveals
two fixed points for any interpretation of the model, namely, its openly cos-
mopolitan goals and the heterarchical structure of the institutions that should
accomplish them. I am entirely sympathetic with both of these features of
the model. That is, I agree that the constitutionalization of international law
is of normative interest mainly to the extent that it may allow for a «global
domestic politics» geared towards achieving global justice, solving ecological
problems, etc. I also agree that a heterarchical political structure for the world
order is in principle more desirable than a world government, since it mini-
mizes the risks of an excessive concentration of political power. Moreover,
the specific design of a multilevel system with different political units at the
supranational, transnational, and national levels seems attractive to me too. The
Habermasian model retains the current system of nation states at the nation-
al level and envisages not only a suitably reformed world organization as a
single actor at the supranational level, but also the formation of a few region-
al or continental regimes at the transnational level (US, China, Russia, India,
7. In the analysis that follows I draw from Lafont (2008).
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EU, ASEAN, AU, etc.). These continental regimes would fill the role of glob-
al players in charge of negotiating and implementing a «global domestic pol-
itics» in the transnational arena. Habermas admits that such a system of viable
global players does not currently exist, but hopes that the EU could serve as
a model for those regions of the world that are not «born» continental regimes
such as China or Russia. Where I begin to sense difficulties, however, is with
the assignment of specific tasks and specific means to the different units of
the system. Habermas describes them very briefly in the following terms:
A suitably reformed world organization could perform the vital but clearly
circumscribed functions of securing peace and promoting human rights at the
supranational level… At the intermediate, transnational level, the major powers
would address the difficult problems of a global domestic politics which are
no longer restricted to mere coordination but extend to promoting actively a
rebalanced world order. They would have to cope with global economic and
ecological problems within the framework of permanent conferences and nego-
tiation systems… The multilevel system outlined would fulfill the peace and
human rights goals of the UN Charter at the supranational level and address
problems of global domestic politics through compromises among domesti-
cated major powers at the transnational level (2005, 136).
As I will try to show in what follows, it is by trying to match the ends and
means that are identified in this multilevel system that widely different possi-
bilities in interpretation of the model arise, some of which seem normatively
so deflated as to cast serious doubts on its avowed cosmopolitan goals for an
international order.
As already mentioned, Habermas rejects an institutional cosmopolitanism
that would link the possibility of implementing a global politics with the exis-
tence of a world government, but he also rejects the anti-cosmopolitan view of
the international order as strictly limited to the voluntary recognition of mul-
tilateral treaties among fully sovereign nation states. Here his main argument
is empirical. In view of the current process of globalization, nation states are
simply not able to solve the problems of regulating the global economy or con-
fronting global ecological threats. But beyond the unquestionable fact of glob-
alization there are normative reasons as well. Although he does not get into
much detail, the kind of economic problems that he mentions reveal the nor-
mative core of the project. A global domestic politics should not address mere-
ly technical problems of coordination that arise with the globalization of the
market economy, but genuine «political» questions such as the need to «overcome
the extreme differential in welfare within a highly stratified world society»
through distributive measures (2008, 346). The egalitarian goal of overcom-
ing worldwide economic inequalities puts the Habermasian project potential-
ly at odds with critics of egalitarian cosmopolitanism (most notably, Rawls)
who reject the legitimacy of global distributive policies beyond individual states.
However, in order to more precisely situate the Habermasian model with-
in the intricate net of cosmopolitan and anti-cosmopolitan views currently
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available, it is necessary to reconstruct the normative assumptions on which
it is based —assumptions that Habermas has not yet explicitly spelled out.
We need to determine not only the nature and scope, but also, and most
importantly, the normative justification for the «global domestic politics»
that Habermas proposes in order to know which normative standpoints are
compatible with it and which ones it directly opposes. A crucial issue in that
regard is to determine whether some of the goals of the global domestic pol-
itics that the Habermasian model envisages are called for as a matter of jus-
tice under current circumstances, or whether they should be interpreted as
merely aspirational political goals that citizens of the world could eventual-
ly embrace if and when they see themselves as members of a single political
community at the global level. In contradistinction to the former, the latter
interpretation would not be opposed to anti-cosmopolitan views on nor-
mative grounds, since the disagreement would be basically empirical. In gen-
eral, critics of cosmopolitanism believe that a global political community of
world citizens does not exist and never will. Granted, many also believe that
it would be undesirable, but even so, this still says nothing about what would
be normatively appropriate to do if, however regrettably, it eventually came
into existence. Under these circumstances, it seems that at least those crit-
ics of cosmopolitanism who are domestic egalitarians (such as Rawls, Nagel,
Freeman, etc.) would have no reason to oppose global distributive polices
as a component of a global domestic politics. Now, since Habermas does
not address this important question explicitly, we can only follow an indi-
rect path to his answer.
In the contemporary discussion on normative models for a new world
order, it is widely agreed that international justice requires guaranteeing peace,
security, and the protection of human rights. However, whereas the goals of
peace and security are uncontroversial, the same cannot be said regarding
the goal of protecting human rights. The scope of human rights recognized in the
different models varies widely. However, it would be wrong to infer from this
variation that agreement on the goal is therefore only apparent. The current
disagreements on the precise content or scope of human rights should not dis-
tract from widespread agreement on the crucial function that human rights
are supposed to play, namely, to set the appropriate moral standards for eval-
uation and criticism of the institutions and social conditions under which
human beings live. It is precisely because there is agreement on the key role
that human rights play in determining the threshold of tolerance below which
some kind of intervention by the international community is appropriate, or
even required, as a matter of basic justice, that it is hard to reach agreement
on what those rights are. In view of the potential consequences, the stakes are
very high in letting something count as a human right. But, again, this is pre-
cisely where the normative power of human rights lies8. They generate gen-
uine duties, signal the normative limits to inaction, have the power to mobi-
8. See Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (1999).
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lize anyone, and, at the very least, can ruin reputations through the public
«shaming and blaming» of any government or institution that violates them.
There is no other normative weapon quite like it in the international arena9.
Precisely in virtue of the tight connection between human rights and jus-
tice, focusing on what different models have to say about human rights is a
useful shortcut for situating realistic utopias on the broad continuum between
the barbaric and the ideal before a thorough assessment of all its normative
consequences is available10. The usual candidates for disagreement are the so-
called economic and social rights, followed by political rights to democratic
participation. But, sadly enough, even the right to full equality is not unques-
tioned11. Some authors opt for a minimalist strategy in identifying basic human
rights with the hope that it may command universal assent in the international
community12, whereas others follow a more generous agenda with the inten-
tion of increasing their model’s normative bite13. But even the most utopian
9. Nickel (2006) offers the following list of political roles that human rights serve in several inter-
national organizations: they provide
1. Standards for education about good government. The preamble to the Universal Dec-
laration emphasizes that human rights are to be promoted by «teaching and education».
2. Guides to suitable content for bills of rights at the national level.
3. Guides to domestic aspirations, reform, and criticism.
4. Guides to when rebellion against a government is permissible.
5. Guides to when a country’s leaders and generals should be prosecuted domestically for
human rights crimes.
6. Standards to be used as reference points in making periodic reports to the committees estab-
lished by human rights treaties about progress in respecting and implementing human rights.
7. Standards for considering complaints and adjudicating cases (the European, Inter-
American, and United Nations human rights systems have international courts).
8. Standards for criticisms of governments by their citizens, by people in other countries,
and by national and international NGOs. Many NGOs define their missions by reference
to human rights.
9. Standards for actions to promote human rights by the UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights, the UN General Assembly, and other international organizations.
10. Standards for evaluating the suitability of countries for financial aid.
11. Standards for deciding whether to prosecute or convict the leaders or former leaders
of a country within the International Criminal Court.
12. Standards for international criticism and diplomatic action by governments or inter-
national organizations.
13. Standards for recommending economic sanctions by international organizations and
for imposing them by governments.
14. Standards for military intervention by international organizations or governments» (p. 270).
10. The reception of Rawls’s Law of Peoples offers a clear example. Although a full assessment
of this complex work is not yet available, it has been very revealing for its disappointed crit-
ics to realize that in Rawls’s utopian world the power of human rights should not be avail-
able even if rights to nondiscrimination were denied to some citizens, say, if women’s rights
to full equality or to education were not honored, or if the political rights to democratic
participation or the freedom of conscience of some citizens were constrained. For a good
overview of the recent reception of Rawls’s Law of Peoples see Martin and Reidy (2006).
11. See Rawls (1999).
12. See Ignatieff (2001).
13. See Shue (1996).
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among the latter fall short of proposing anything as ambitious as the set of
human rights provisions contained in the International Bill of Human Rights
that14 the General Assembly of the UN has adopted over the last decades and
that most countries of the world have already endorsed. Among these provisions,
the favorite candidate for mockery by critics of maximalist agendas is the right
to «periodic holidays with pay» contained in Article 24 of the UDHR15. Need-
less to say, the fact that most countries of the world have ratified many of these
human rights treaties does not mean that all or most of these countries also
comply with them. But what it does mean is that the legal standards that bind
the international community and guide current practice16 are far more ambi-
tious than those contained in many of the realistic utopias offered by academics,
however astonishing that may be. As often happens, the owl of Minerva may
yet again be spreading its wings only after dusk.
Now, if one focuses on the Habermasian model in order to figure out the
exact scope of human rights provisions that a future international order should
recognize, it turns out that the presentation of his proposal is ambiguous. As
is customary, Habermas claims that a reformed world organization should
have the functions of securing peace and protecting human rights. However,
he does not spell out in any detail what he means by «protecting human rights».
Sometimes an ultraminimalist reading is offered, according to which, pro-
tecting human rights should be understood as «the clearly circumscribed» func-
tion of preventing «massive human rights violations» such as genocide by mobi-
lizing the military forces of member states against criminal states if necessary
(2005, 143, 170). At other times, an ultra ambitious reading is offered, accord-
ing to which implementing human rights is identified with achieving «the
human rights goals of the UN Charter» (2005, 136). Needless to say, it makes
all the difference in the world whether the model is supposed to achieve one goal
or the other.
The difficulty here reaches deeper than it may seem, for neither of these
readings offers a stable basis for a general interpretation of the overall goals of
the model. Under the ambitious interpretation, the function of protecting
human rights would require guaranteeing, among other things, the minimal
14. The International Bill of Human Rights consists of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its two Optional Proto-
cols.
15. For an interesting argument against these criticisms see Waldron (1993), 12ff.
16. For a compelling interpretation of human rights as an emergent political and discursive
global practice see Beitz (2009). One of the most attractive features of Beitz’s approach is that
it offers a plausible basis to resist the tendency towards substantive minimalism that is inher-
ent in most alternative conceptions of human rights. However, this attractive feature of his
approach seems unduly curtailed by Beitz’s additional commitment to a state-centric inter-
pretation of the practice. Since this commitment seems plainly unmotivated, if not direct-
ly undermined by some of Beitz’s own arguments, its acceptance does not seem required
by any intrinsic feature of the practical approach per se. In fact, the opposite may be the
case (see footnote 36).
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social and economic conditions necessary to achieve the human rights goals
of the UN Charter. However, this interpretation is explicitly ruled out by
Habermas’s contention that the world organization should steer away from
any «political» goals that «touch on issues of redistribution» (2008, 336). He
insists that distributive questions are intrinsically «political» and claims that
for that reason the reformed world organization should be «exonerated from the
immense tasks of a global domestic politics» (2008, 346). This claim leaves
only the ultraminimalist interpretation, according to which the function of
protecting human rights consists exclusively in the duty of preventing «massive
human rights violations» that are due to armed conflicts such as ethnic cleans-
ing or genocide. Now, once the task of protecting human rights and the task
of implementing a global domestic politics are severed in this way, the latter
can no longer be interpreted as responsible for guaranteeing the social and
economic conditions necessary to achieve the human rights goals of the UN
Charter, since the function of protecting human rights (together with securing
peace) belongs exclusively to the reformed world organization, according to
Habermas. But neither is the world organization in charge of guaranteeing
such conditions. So, one way or the other, under the division of labor fore-
seen in the Habermasian model it turns out that no one is in charge of guar-
anteeing the social and economic conditions necessary to achieve the human
rights goals of the UN Charter. It is not only the scope of human rights pro-
visions that is undetermined; their implementation is in a normative limbo17.
What I find most problematic in this proposal is not so much that it «exon-
erates» the institutions in charge of protecting human rights from the immense
tasks of a global domestic politics. It is rather that, by the same token, the
global domestic politics is «exonerated» of the function of protecting human
rights. As a consequence, the goals of the global domestic politics are no longer
conceived as strict obligations of justice, but as merely aspirational goals, that
is, as «political» goals that reflect differences in value orientation and ideals
and should therefore be agreed upon through negotiated compromises among
the conflicting value preferences and interests of the participants. Under this
interpretation, the goal that Habermas mentions of «overcoming the extreme
17. In a nutshell, the problem is the following. The institutions at the supranational level which
are in charge of fulfilling the human rights goals of the UN Charter do not have any legal
or political means to do so, since the only means at their disposal is military intervention
in cases of wars of aggression or genocide, whereas the institutions at the transnational level
which have the legal and political means for implementing a global domestic politics through
negotiated compromises are not legally constrained by any institution in charge of moni-
toring that the policies that result from such compromises do not infringe upon the oblig-
ation of protecting the human rights of the UN Charter. Following the analogy at the
national level, we would have a constitutional state in which the institution in charge of
protecting constitutional rights would only have the legal powers of calling for military
intervention in cases of severe civil strife, but no legal means for supervising the constitu-
tionality of ordinary legislation. No institution would be in charge of fulfilling the latter
function.
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differential in welfare within a highly stratified world society» becomes a noble
political aspiration alongside the protection of coral reefs or the promotion
of the arts. Indeed, since the goals of a global domestic politics are no longer
geared to fulfill strict obligations of justice, they cannot be determined in
advance. Their specific content will in each case depend on the constellation
of ethical-political orientations of the major global players involved in deter-
mining them. Fulfillment of the most basic human rights worldwide by, say,
eradicating severe world poverty, could be a goal of a global domestic politics,
but yet again it might not be. It all depends on whether altruistic values hap-
pen to triumph over other legitimate interests and value preferences of the
major global players, such as the interest in eradicating the differential in wel-
fare within their own countries first, for example. But is it really plausible to
think that from a normative point of view all that justice requires of the inter-
national community in order to fulfill the function of protecting human rights
worldwide is to prevent war and crimes against humanity and any more ambi-
tious goal is ultimately a matter of choice among conflicting political ideals? In
order to answer this question we need to more carefully examine the norma-
tive reasons that Habermas supplies in favor of the ultraminimalist interpretation
of the duties of justice of the international community.
According to the ultraminimalist interpretation of the function of protect-
ing human rights, the international community represented in a reformed world
organization is, as a matter of duty, responsible for preventing massive human
rights violations such as ethnic cleansing or genocide and, if necessary, to pre-
vent such violations through military intervention. But preventing other kinds
of human rights violations is not part of the negative duties of justice of the
international community, but is instead a positive or, as Habermas calls it, «con-
structive» political task18. That is, tasks involving the prevention of other kind
of human rights violations concern ethical-political preferences that are intrin-
sically plural and ultimately dependent on different conceptions of the good.
For this reason, so the argument goes, they must be relegated to a global domes-
tic politics that, in a similar fashion to the domestic politics of individual states19,
must come about through negotiated compromises among the different polit-
ical conceptions and ideals of the major players involved. Habermas explains
this view as follows:
18. The term Habermas (2005) uses is «politische Gestaltungsaufgaben». An example of its
use is offered in the following passage: «Die Vereinten Nationen sind unter der Vorausset-
zung der souveränen Gleichheit ihrer Mitglieder eher auf normativ geregelte Konsensbildung
als auf politisch erkämpften Interessenausgleich zugeschnitten, also für politische Gelstal-
tungsaufgaben nicht geeignet» (359, my italics).
19. As already mentioned in footnote 17, it should be clear that the analogy with the nation-
al level does not hold. In constitutional democracies, the basic rights of citizens are pre-
cisely not subject to majoritarian decisions brought about through compromises among
different political orientations. To the contrary, the constitutional rights of citizens mark
the limits within which ordinary legislation can be legitimate.
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If the international community limits itself to securing peace and protecting
human rights, the requisite solidarity among world citizens need not reach the level
of the implicit consensus on thick political value-orientations that is necessary for the
familiar kind of civic solidarity among fellow-nationals. Consonance in reactions
of moral outrage toward egregious human rights violations and manifest acts of
aggression is sufficient. Such agreement in negative affective responses to per-
ceived acts of mass criminality suffices for integrating an abstract community of
world citizens. The clear negative duties of a universalistic morality of justice —the
duty not to engage in wars of aggression and not to commit crimes against humani-
ty— ultimately constitute the standard for the verdicts of the international courts
and the political decisions of the world organization. This basis for judgment pro-
vided by common cultural dispositions is slender but robust. It suffices for bundling
the worldwide normative reactions into an agenda for the international community
and it lends legitimating force to the voices of a global public whose attention is
continually directed to specific issues by the media (2005, 143; my italics).
According to this passage, all it takes for the international community to ful-
fill the function of protecting human rights is to limit itself to preventing wars
of aggression and crimes against humanity. A key element of this ultramini-
malist interpretation of the function of protecting human rights is Habermas’s
appeal to the problematic distinction between negative and positive duties.
This distinction in turn justifies a sharp distinction between types of human
rights violations, namely, those that trigger an inescapable universal responsi-
bility to act from the international community and those that do not. Although
he does not offer an elaborate justification for the distinction, he hints at two
possible interconnected lines of argument. On the one hand, as defenders of
the distinction between negative and positive duties usually argue, the sug-
gestion is that negative duties require only self-restraint. The agent is required
merely to refrain from doing something, and is not forced to act positively in
some way or another. For this reason, negative duties can be sufficiently spe-
cific and universal in scope, so the argument goes, whereas positive duties are
intrinsically vague regarding the question of who is supposed to do what20.
On the other hand, this vagueness points to a deeper problem, namely, any
attempt to specify such duties involves interpretation and thus reflects differ-
ences in value orientations. For this reason, it would be much harder to achieve
consensus on such duties among groups with different ethical-political con-
ceptions. Consequently, ascribing «positive» duties to the international com-
munity would call into question the legitimacy of the decisions of the world
organization. Let’s examine both lines of argument in detail.
According to the first line of argument, negative duties that only require
self-restraint on the part of the agent are the only «clear negative duties of a
universalistic morality of justice». That may be true. But even if we grant this
20. For one of the most influential defenses of this line of argument to question the genuine
status of positive rights see O’Neill (1996) and (2000). For an interesting critical analysis
of the internal difficulties of O’Neill’s views see Ashford (2009).
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claim for the sake of the argument, it does not seem very helpful in our con-
text, for what is at issue here is not so much the «negative» duties to refrain
from wars of aggression and from committing crimes against humanity, but,
above all, the «positive» duties to intervene against such crimes through the
use of military force, to provide the means necessary for guaranteeing the secu-
rity of civilians for as long as it is needed, to put at risk the lives of soldiers
and other citizens entirely uninvolved in the conflict at issue, etc. In short,
what is in need of justification is precisely the «positive» obligation of the inter-
national community to act instead of refraining from intervening whenever
crimes against humanity or wars of aggression are committed by any country.
Self-restraint by the members of the international community is part of the
problem, not the solution. Moreover, given that what is «positively» required
of the international community in terms of military, economic, and human
resources is so remarkably high whenever these types of human rights viola-
tions occur, the argument from self-restraint seems particularly unfit to single
out these types of human rights violations as the only ones able to trigger uni-
versal obligations to act on the part of the international community21. But
let’s examine the second line of argument.
According to it, what would distinguish this type of human rights viola-
tions from all others is not so much the nature of the actions that it calls for,
but the scale of the atrocities involved. They are simply the worst possible
actions from a moral point of view. Therefore, if there is any chance at all to
reach a consensus among the members of the international community on the
obligation of preventing any human rights violations whatsoever, these types
of violations will be part of it or nothing will. This argument from consensus
is hinted at by Habermas when he claims that «the negative duties of a uni-
versalistic morality of justice —the duty not to engage in wars of aggression
and not to commit crimes against humanity— are rooted in all cultures and
they happily correspond to the legally specified standards which the institu-
tions of the world organization themselves use to justify their decisions» (2008,
358; my italics). It can hardly be disputed that wars of aggression and crimes
against humanity are human rights violations of the most hideous kind. Indeed,
if they could not trigger a universal moral consensus on the obligation to active-
ly prevent them by the members of the international community, nothing
would. However, what is at issue here is quite a different claim, namely, that no
other type of human rights violation can plausibly trigger a universal moral
21. If one takes into account Shue’s (1996) useful distinction between the duty «to avoid depriv-
ing» and the duty «to protect from deprivation» (60), it seems clear that the first duty is
universal in a sense in which the second is not, since the second type of duty necessarily
raises the question of who in particular is to be assigned the responsibility to protect in each
case. My argument does not aim to deny this distinction. All I am arguing is that duties of
protection by the international community are as much at issue in cases of massive human
rights violations due to armed conflicts such as ethnic cleansing or genocide as they are in
the case of violations of economic origin. Thus if the former type of violations can trigger
positive obligations to act by the international community, so can the latter.
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consensus of the international community and thus be considered a negative
duty of justice. In order to justify this claim, what would need to be shown is
that some distinctive feature of this type of human rights violation sets it apart
from all others in terms of its moral significance. So, let’s see whether this is
the case.
As already mentioned, the scale of the atrocities potentially involved in
those cases is one of its most distinctive features. They are «massive» human
rights violations. But many natural catastrophes involve massive death and
suffering as well. So the moral issue regarding the former is not simply the
sheer number of human beings potentially affected. But neither is the issue at
hand simply the fact that these violations are man-made, since many others
are as well. Beyond being man-made and massive in scope, what makes them
so horrific from a moral point of view is that they are totally undeserved and
unprovoked by the victims and, in addition, that the victims often lack any
efficient means of self-defense. This last feature is crucial in our context, since
it is what triggers positive obligations to act by unaffected third parties. It is
because these massive atrocities could be prevented, in contradistinction to
many natural catastrophes, but not by the victims themselves, that not only
the perpetrators, but also those uninvolved third parties who have effective
means at their disposal are morally obligated to prevent their occurrence as a
matter of basic justice.
Now, taking this rough identification of morally significant features as a
guideline, it seems to me that there are other types of human rights violations
that clearly fit the description. Let’s take the example of the large-scale deaths and
suffering of people affected of curable diseases worldwide. According to the
WHO, some 18 million human beings die prematurely each year from medical
conditions that could easily be cured22. They lack access to essential medicines
that are widely available simply because they (and in some cases the govern-
ments of their countries as well) cannot afford the price. This dynamic is, of
course, connected to the fact that over 2,800 million people23 live under con-
ditions of extreme depravation, malnutrition, lack of access to clean water, etc.,
as severe poverty is the primary determinant of high morbidity due to curable
diseases. Given that the right to life is fortunately not yet under dispute, it seems
safe to claim that the most basic human rights of the 18 million people who
die yearly of preventable diseases are not protected. Now, as astonishing as it
may seem to some of us, agreement on this undisputable fact is not sufficient to
motivate agreement about there being any specific human rights violations in
this case. Although the scale of the atrocity is undisputed and, at least with
regard to 2/3 of the victims who are children under five, no minimally reason-
able moral conception can deny that it is entirely undeserved, the lack of a spe-
cific perpetrator to whom the «violation» of their human rights can be causally
22. As cited in Pogge (2005), 190.
23. This World Bank’s estimate is considered by many people as flawed. For more information
on this issue see Pogge (2004).
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ascribed is often alleged to set these cases apart from the type of human rights
violations involved in atrocities such as ethnic cleansing or genocide. Whether
this alleged disanalogy suffices to neutralize any obligations to intervene on the
part of those who have effective means at their disposal to prevent their occur-
rence is totally unclear to me, but, in any event, let’s focus on a more specific case.
As is well-known, in the particular case of victims of HIV/AIDS24, gov-
ernments of poor countries were prevented from guaranteeing access to treatment
to their citizens not because they lack the means to produce them, but because
they were forced to comply with the 1995 agreement on Trade-Related Aspects
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) reached by the international commu-
nity under the auspices of the WTO25. This agreement grants pharmaceutical
companies a monopoly on the production of medicines for a twenty-year peri-
od, during which they can charge as much as they want for them, ostensibly
to recover their initial investment in research. Since in this case the massive vio-
lation of the basic human right to life can be directly linked to a specific inter-
national regulation, there can be no doubt that this atrocity is man-made, if
anything is. In this case we find the happy coincidence between those respon-
sible for the violation and those who have the means to prevent it that some
may claim is lacking in the case of deaths through severe poverty. But then what
specific moral feature could justify a lack of universal moral consensus on the
obligation to actively prevent this type of massive human rights violation by
the members of the international community? In virtue of what argument or rea-
son could a moral conception justify inaction in these cases of large-scale, man-
made deaths and not in the others? Granted, it may be difficult to come up
with a new regulation on patents that would solve all social, economic, and
technical issues involved26, but, needless to say, this is even more clearly the
case regarding human rights violations due to ethnic conflicts.
In fact, some empirical evidence suggests that the possibility of universal moral
consensus within the international community in this type of cases is very likely.
In recent years, the governments of relatively weak countries such as Thailand
and South Africa decided to issue compulsory licenses or pass laws to allow the pro-
duction of generic versions of some antiretroviral AIDS drugs in what the phar-
maceutical companies considered a direct violation of the rules of the TRIPS
regime, but they were able to get away with this alleged violation without suffer-
ing a trade boycott from the international community precisely because of an
24. According to the UNAIDS/WHO Aids Epidemic Update from December 2006, in 2006
there were 40 million people living with HIV around the world. 3 million people die each
year from AIDS-related deaths. For more information see: http://www.unaids.org/
en/HIV_data/epi2006.
25. According to recent statistics, 75% of adults and 90% of children infected with HIV who
urgently need treatment are currently not receiving it. For more information see:
http://www.stopaidscampaign.org.uk.
26. For an interesting alternative proposal to the current TRIPS regime concerning medicines
see Hollis and Pogge (2008). This book is available for download at: http://www/yale.edu/
mcmillan/igh/hif.html.
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emerging consensus that the current regulation is morally unacceptable. Fortu-
nately, in this case we already witnessed the kind of reactions of moral outrage
toward egregious human rights violations by the emerging global public opinion
that Habermas predicts for the other types of violations27. These reactions prompt-
ed some pharmaceutical companies, companies that originally tried to prosecute
the governments of Thailand and South Africa, to issue voluntary licenses to them
instead28. Moreover, the high publicity of the conflict eventually lead WTO mem-
bers to amend a core WTO agreement for the first time, implicitly recognizing the
organization’s responsibility for protecting the right to health29. It remains to be
seen whether this process eventually leads the global players involved to establish
morally acceptable regulations on patents30. Be that as it may, at the very least
this conflict has brought to public light the need to integrate human rights con-
siderations in the crafting and implementing of WTO rules31.
27. In 2001, thirty-nine major pharmaceutical companies tried to prosecute the South African
government for passing a law (which they said was against TRIPS regulations) that allowed
easy production and importation of generics. They had to back down after they received
immense pressure from the South African government, the European Parliament and
300,000 people from over 130 countries that signed a petition against the action. For
more information on this issue see:  http://www.aegis.com/news/re/2001/RE011009.html.
Since then the number of campaigns to demand guaranteed HIV treatment for all has
increased considerably. For information concerning current campaigns worldwide see:
http://www.stopaidscampaign.org.uk.
28. For the decision of GlaxoSmithKline to grant a voluntary license to Aspen, a major South
African generics producer, see:  http://www.aegis.com/news/re/2001/RE011009.html. For
the campaign of activists around the world against Abbot’s attempts to block Thailand
from producing generic versions of its AIDS treatments see: http://www.abbottsgreed.com.
29. In 2003, WTO member governments approved a decision that offered an interim waiver
under the TRIPS Agreement allowing a member country to export pharmaceutical prod-
ucts made under compulsory licenses to least-developed and certain other members. At the
2005 Hong Kong Ministerial, members agree to a permanent amendment to incorporate
the 2003 decision, which will become effective when it is ratified by two-thirds of the mem-
ber states. To date, 38 countries have ratified the agreement. For more information see:
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm. For an excellent analy-
sis of the human rights obligations of the WTO based on the specific case of TRIPS and the
right to health see Herstermeyer (2007).
30. The most obvious and problematic consequence of the TRIPS regime is its devastating
impact on the ability of governments of poor countries to provide their citizens with access
to essential medicines, but there are many more problematic consequences as well. From its
long-term impact on the ability of governments of poor countries to protect their citizen’s rights
to an education (because of copyright restrictions) to the impact on the ability to protect
the most basic subsistence rights of citizens —particularly amidst an anticipated four-fold
rise of transfers from developing countries to rich countries due to license payments to
transnational companies (according to the World Bank’s estimate). As Wolf (2004) indi-
cates, this sum alone would fully offset all development assistance (see Wolf 2004, 217ff ).
31. For some evidence in that direction see the 2001 Doha Declaration on TRIPS Agreement
and Public Health in: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/minde-
cl_trips_e.htm. For interesting proposals on how to integrate WTO law and international
human rights law see Marceau (2002), Cottier, Pauwelyn and Burgi (2005), Zaglin (2005),
Herstermeyer (2007). For an interesting analysis of the scope of human rights obligations
of non-state actors under international law see Clapham (2006).
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Now, in the same way that the rules of the TRIPS regime can lead to human
rights violations, many other economic regulations are accused of doing so as
well by active participants in the emergent global public sphere. According to
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), poor
countries could export $700 billion more a year if rich countries were to open
their markets as much as poor countries are obligated to under the interna-
tional trade regulations adopted by the members of the WTO32. According
to the World Bank, abolishing all current trade barriers could lift 320 million
people out of poverty by 201533. This policy change would certainly help pro-
tecting the basic human rights of citizens of poor countries by considerably
reducing the scale of yearly deaths of preventable diseases. Of course, all these
regulatory issues are highly complex and therefore bound to be controversial,
but fortunately I do not need to defend any particular regulation here. I am
simply pointing to examples of current international regulations that can have
drastic effects on the possibility of protecting the basic human rights of huge
sectors of the world population. More importantly, I am intentionally select-
ing examples that do not involve the adoption of redistributive measures geared
towards «overcoming the extreme differential in welfare within a highly strat-
ified world society»34. Although I disagree that all distributive issues are essen-
tially «political» in the sense that Habermas alludes to, I do not want my argu-
ment to depend on denying that claim at all, since this seems controversial.
All I am trying to show is that there is no plausible reason to accept the ultra-
minimalist interpretation of what constitutes «massive human rights viola-
tions». It is simply implausible to assume that no matter which horrific effects
the regulations of the global economic order may actually have on the possi-
bility of protecting the most basic human rights of the world population, only
military or armed actions such as wars or ethnic cleansing fall under the purview
of the standard of justice that «the institutions of the world organization them-
selves use to justify their decisions» (2008, 358). In particular, in light of the
examples just mentioned, it seems implausible to suggest that any more gen-
erous interpretation of the function of protecting human rights necessarily
involves «constructive» political tasks that cannot be justified as a matter of
negative duties of justice and therefore must be determined through negoti-
ated compromises. Since these examples «do not touch on distributive issues»
at all, what is the justification for excluding them in principle from the scope
of the standards of justice that support the «political decisions of the world
32. This amount is ten times the annual amount of all official development assistance world-
wide. See UNCTAD (1999).
33. See World Bank (2001).
34. As the examples suggest, achieving global justice concerning economic issues should not
be primarily understood as a matter of redistributing resources, but also (and perhaps even
more importantly) as a matter of establishing fair power relations among those affected by
economic relations. Ronzoni (2009) offers a similar view as a justification for using the
term «socioeconomic justice», instead of «distributive justice», to refer to the obligations
of transnational justice concerning economic issues.
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organization» and thereby leaving their prevention to the vagaries of the nego-
tiated compromises among global players seeking their own advantage?
One reason that Habermas gives for ruling out all «problems» of econom-
ic origin from the strictly circumscribed and legally specified domain of human
rights violations is that «these problems cannot be solved by bringing power
and law to bear against unwilling or incapable nation states» (2008, 346). But
I do not see how this is really any different in the case of human rights viola-
tions due to armed conflicts. It is true that the international community can
intervene militarily against an unwilling state to prevent such human rights
violations, particularly if it is a militarily weak state. But, obviously, this is only
possible if and when all other states involved are willing to intervene. As we
painfully witnessed in recent times, genocide of horrible proportions took
place in Rwanda and more recently in Darfur and we must sadly recognize
that this problem «cannot be solved by bringing power and law to bear against
unwilling or incapable nation states». Nothing can get done at the interna-
tional level without the willingness or the consensus of the states involved, but
this can hardly distinguish human rights violations of economic origin from
those due to armed conflicts. In fact, it seems to me more reasonable to expect
member states of the international community to willingly get involved in
effecting changes to some current laws (like the TRIPS regime)35 than it is to
expect them to willingly partake in risky and expensive military operations.
I certainly agree that it will be hard to achieve consensus in the interna-
tional community about changes in laws that affect the economic interests of
their members, particularly if it affects the interests of the most powerful mem-
bers. However, I think that a concession to realism at this particular point is not
a meaningful trade-off for a normative model of a future international order,
since it deflates the normative goals without making them any more likely to
be achieved. In short, the results are neither realistic nor utopian. Setting aside
for the moment the goal of solving global ecological threats, let’s concentrate
on the other utopian goal of the Habermasian model, namely, to «overcome
the extreme differential in welfare within the highly stratified world society».
Now, if it is true that there is in fact no hope for a global consensus on the
need to prevent any massive human rights violations of economic origin, then
35. For an interesting analysis of different ways in which the WTO could integrate protection
of human rights in the settlement of trade disputes see Pauwelyn (2005). The author dis-
tinguishes between positive (i.e., protective) and negative (i.e., defensive) uses of human
rights standards and, as an example of the later, refers explicitly to the conflict between
TRIPs obligations and AIDS protection. In that context, he mentions the following exam-
ple of a possible solution that could be adopted by the dispute settlement system of the
WTO: «With regard to the human rights obligations of WTO members themselves,
the most extreme form of defensive or negative human rights usage would be to permit WTO
members to deviate from their trade obligations as soon as those obligations hamper the
fulfillment of their human rights commitments. Alone those lines, one could then permit,
for example, Botswana (where 38 per cent of the population is infected with HIV/AIDS)
to suspend its TRIPs obligations in order to meet its human rights obligations in the area
of public health» (p. 208).
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there is no hope for a global domestic politics geared toward these goals, let
alone one geared toward the much more ambitious and contested egalitarian
goal of «overcoming the extreme differential in welfare within the highly strat-
ified world society». In this regard, it does not make any difference whether
the major players for implementing such «global domestic politics» are state
governments as members of a transformed world organization at the supra-
national level or the same governments as members of continental regimes at
the transnational level. If there is no hope for a consensus on such goals, then
they won’t be implemented at any level whatsoever. Especially in times of a
global economic crisis, it may be utterly unrealistic to expect rich and power-
ful countries to willingly «re-regulate the world economy» by changing the
current policies to their own disadvantage. Given this situation, we need to
see what realistic reasons can be offered for «exonerating» the international
community (as represented in a future world organization) from any direct
involvement in «global domestic politics» and leaving its determination to the
negotiated compromises among «domesticated» global players seeking their
own advantage.
One obvious realistic reason would amount to a straightforward skeptical
concession, namely, that it will happen this way or it won’t happen at all. This
may be a realistic assessment, but it could hardly count as a positive feature of
a normative model. In other words, after such a concession the model could no
longer advertise itself as answering the utopian question of how a global domes-
tic politics is possible that is specifically aimed towards global justice and not
towards some other goal (e.g., economic growth of rich countries). However,
Habermas’s use of the term «domesticated» to qualify the major global play-
ers hints to a realistic reason of a different kind. On the one hand, the use of
the term indicates the strategic orientation in pursuing their own advantage
that is ascribed to such global players. But on the other, the term also suggests
that there is some constraint that can force them to change the current regu-
lations of the global economic order in a more egalitarian direction. Haber-
mas indicates that «a global domestic politics without a world government
would be embedded within the framework of the world organization» (2005,
136). So, presumably the major powers are «domesticated» through the con-
straints that the supranational system imposes. However, the only constraint
that Habermas mentions in that context is «the fact that, under an effective
UN peace and security regime, even global players would be forbidden to
resort to war as a legitimate means of resolving conflicts» (2005, 136). This
limitation is certainly in accordance with the ultraminimalist interpretation
of the functions of a future world organization, for if the later were to impose
constraints directly related to economic policies it would get entangled in gen-
uinely «political» decisions and would put its legitimacy at risk. However,
it is hard to see how a constraint in the use of military means could be of any help
to move the more powerful major powers to change the current laws and reg-
ulations of the global economic order towards more fair and egalitarian ones
against their own advantage. What is at issue in re-regulating the world
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economy is not preventing the use of military force by any of the global play-
ers but, above all, preventing the inaction of those global players that directly
profit from the status quo. For better or for worse, the use of military force is
neither a realistic nor a normatively acceptable option for changing the laws
and regulations of the global economy. Now, since this is the only constraint
that the ultraminimalist interpretation of the functions and mandate of the
institutions of a future world organization contemplates, perhaps we could
find a more suitable constraint coming from below, that is, from the relation-
ship between the transnational and the national level.
In this context, the reason that Habermas adduces for leaving everything that
touches upon the re-regulation of the world economy to the negotiated com-
promises among global players concerns the legitimacy of this type of political
decision. Under the assumption that any economic regulation is (roughly)
either technical or political, and the further, more problematic assumption
that any political regulation is ultimately a matter of choice or compromise
among conflicting value preferences, ideals, and interests of the participants
involved, Habermas suggests that economic regulations that are not merely
technical need a kind of democratic legitimacy genuinely different from the
standards of justice that can be provided by the international community. As
is the case at the level of nation states, alternative political goals must be decid-
ed through democratic majoritarian decisions, since they ultimately reflect
thick value orientations of the participants that are diverse and mutually incom-
patible. This line of argument is not elaborated in detail, but it seems to involve
both realistic and normative considerations.
From a realistic point of view, the optimistic suggestion is that to the extent
that some of the most powerful global players or «continental regimes» are
themselves democratically constituted, it is plausible to expect pressure com-
ing from below, that is, from their own national constituencies, towards a more
democratic determination of the appropriate goals for a «global domestic pol-
itics» at the transnational level. Now, that may be true. But it seems to me
more likely that citizens of democratic continental regimes would be moved
to push their representatives towards establishing more fair and equitable reg-
ulations of the economic order if they see their impact as a matter of protec-
tion against massive human rights violations than if they see them merely as
a matter of political bargaining among members seeking their own advantage.
In fact, it is hard to see why in a context understood as the voluntary coopera-
tion for mutual advantage of self-interested members, as the Habermasian
model describes it, it would be illegitimate for the citizens of each continental
regime to expect that their representatives defend their own national or con-
tinental interests as strongly as possible by pushing for the most beneficial reg-
ulation. We certainly would like the weakest players to do so. But then why
would it be unfair for the strongest to do the same?
Precisely from this «realistic» perspective, it seems all the more crucial that the
standards of justice and the negative duties of a universalistic morality that
a normative model ascribes to the international community are interpreted in
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the most generous way possible, so that there is no risk that any kind of mas-
sive human rights violations, particularly those of economic origin, end up
excluded. In fact, the progressive acknowledgement on the part of the inter-
national community that some economic regulations bring about massive
human rights violations seems to me the only realistic chance that weak coun-
tries or continental regimes would ever have to curb the will of the most pow-
erful continental regimes. Such a «constraint» coming from above may «domes-
ticate» the major powers that benefit from the status quo and bring them to
accept economic regulations that are less than maximally advantageous for
them. An ultraminimalist interpretation of human rights violations that a pri-
ori limits them to those of armed or military origin offers no constraint at all
for the economic regulations of a global domestic politics. From this perspec-
tive, it matters a lot whether changes in the current economic regulations are
called for as a matter of preventing human rights violations or are simply taken
to be a matter of aspirational political goals that call for compromises among
legitimate but incompatible preferences. Consensus on what is right as a mat-
ter of justice may be hard to achieve, but it has an irreplaceable feature, name-
ly, it binds the members to the duty of guaranteeing its occurrence, whereas
consensus on aspirational political goals does not have the binding force of an
obligation and thus remains for ever dependent on the vagaries of political
will and the potential conflict with other equally worthy goals (such as eco-
nomic growth, national interests, etc.) Worse yet, and precisely for that rea-
son, such aspirational consensus provides normative justification for the inac-
tion of those who profit from the status quo. So, from a realistic point of view,
the ultraminimalist interpretation of the function of protecting human rights
of the international community that simultaneously leaves all economic reg-
ulations of a global domestic politics beyond the purview of that community
and at the mercy of the negotiated compromises among global players makes
the goal of achieving global justice seem utopian in the worst sense of the term.
But perhaps there are some normative reasons to hold to this interpretation.
Habermas’s insistence on the «genuinely political» nature of the goals of a
«global domestic politics» (2008, 336) suggests that it would be wrong to
overextend the standards of international justice that justify the decisions
of the institutions of the world organization to cover the economic regulations of
a global domestic politics. To put it bluntly, the problem with a generous read-
ing of the function of protecting human rights from a normative point of view
seems to be that it would smuggle into the functions and mandate ascribed
to a future world organization a commitment to a social-democratic political
agenda concerning a massive redistribution of wealth at the global level under
the disguise of «protecting human rights». Trying to «disguise» as a matter of
international justice what is at bottom a contested egalitarian political ideal
would undermine the legitimacy of the standards and actions of the world
organization, whereas if such «redistributive measures» were agreed upon
through the voluntarily negotiated compromises of the global players there
would be no deficit in legitimacy. This seems to be the reason behind Haber-
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mas’s recommendation that «the pending reform of the United Nations must
therefore not only focus on strengthening core institutions, but at the same
time to detach that core from the complex of UN-special organizations» (2008,
334-5), since, as he points out elsewhere, «many of the more than 60 special
and sub-organizations within the UN family… are concerned with such polit-
ical tasks… The mandates of organizations such as the World Bank, the IMF,
and above all the WTO extend to political decisions with an immediate impact
on the global economy» (2005, 174-75). According to this view, it would be
better if the functions of current UN institutions such as the IMF or the World
Bank, which have a direct impact on the regulations of the global economy,
are detached from the world organization’s function of protecting human rights
and instead left to the political decisions of the global players at the transnational
level. The function of protecting human rights should be «depoliticized» if it
is to remain legitimate.
Now, there can be no doubt that economic regulations are political. But,
by the same token, there should be no doubt that they raise questions of jus-
tice and thus may lead to massive human rights violations. In this sense, the
problem with many current IMF and WTO regulations is not that they are
political in nature (it could hardly be otherwise), but that they are the wrong reg-
ulations from the point of view of justice. To the extent that they are, they
should be brought in accordance with the human rights standards recognized
by the international community36. But this becomes impossible if such stan-
dards are interpreted in the ultraminimalist sense that only extends to viola-
tions that justify military intervention. The crucial role of an international
agreement on human rights is to set the boundaries of international toleration
and permissible intervention. But there is no reason to limit the types of possible
intervention to the use of military force. If the origin of some human rights
violations is political, the means to prevent them will have to be political as
well. Political interventions geared towards requiring the change of any current
regulations of the global economic order that demonstrably constitute massive
human rights violations are the only way to fulfill the function of protecting
human rights37. And, as the examples discussed above suggest, such interven-
tions need not consist in redistributive measures or be motivated by egalitarian
political ideals of recalcitrant social-democrats. It is one thing to pursue the
egalitarian goal of «overcoming the differential in welfare within the stratified
world society» for its own sake, so to speak, just for the sake of a more egali-
tarian world society. It is quite another to pursue the negative duty of avoiding
harming others by demanding the revision of any economic regulations that
36. For an interesting and detailed analysis of how this could be achieved as regards the IMF,
WTO and World Bank see Hockett (2005).
37. For a defense of a similar view see Beitz (2009), 116. Beitz’s view is similar to the one
defended here insofar as he recognizes that transnational economic regulations may lead
to human rights violations by non-state actors, and that the most effective remedy against
those violations may be to reform rules and structures at the global level. However, the view
defended here is dissimilar to the extent that his model is committed to a state-centric
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demonstrably bring about massive human rights violations38, whether or not
doing so requires redistributive measures. Whereas the first may be a contested
political ideal, the second seems as much an obligation of justice as avoiding
ethnic cleansing or genocide. Whether or not fulfilling those obligations in the
end requires the adoption of distributive measures will in each case depend on
the specific nature of the regulations and their consequences, the most efficient
means to improve or avoid them, etc. But what seems clear is that we cannot
make the discussion and agreement of the international community on the
standards of justice appropriate for the protection of human rights dependent
on whether implementing them may have distributive effects (i.e., may «touch
on issues of equitable distribution that challenge the deeply rooted interests of
the national societies» [2008, 336]). The international discussion and deter-
mination of what constitutes human rights violations must follow the internal
logic of moral discourses within the international community. And only in light
of an international consensus on what justice requires, would it be possible to
determine which decisions are properly «political» and thus can be legitimately
conception of human rights, according to which states bear the primary responsibility
of guaranteeing the human rights of their own citizens and are also the principled guar-
antors of the human rights performance of other states. As indicated in footnote 16,
Beitz’s own arguments seem to directly undermine the plausibility of the state-centric
view. According to Beitz, his practical conception of human rights offers a normative
and not a merely descriptive model of an emergent practice. This allows him to counter
the objection that the practical approach, by aiming to reconstruct the features of a given
practice, must give too much authority to the status quo. Against this objection, he indi-
cates that a normative model has the resources to criticize the practice it aims to recon-
struct, for example when «the practice’s norms are ill-suited to advance its aims» (p. 105).
Now, Beitz also recognizes that in view of the currently existing structures of global gov-
ernance states are bound to fail in their ability to protect the human rights of their citi-
zens, whenever the potential violations are due to transnational regulations or are per-
petrated by non-state actors. If this is the case, it seems that sticking to the view that
states are primarily responsible for the protection of human rights serves no other purpose
than releasing non-state actors of the primary obligation to protect human rights, while
recognizing that they may be uniquely suited to fulfill this function in some cases. This
seems to me to fit exactly Beitz’s description of a «practice’s norm that is ill-suited to
advance its aims». If so, the model should have the resources to adopt a critical stance
towards the state-centric norm precisely to the extent that it is ill-suited to advance the
practice’s own aim of protecting human rights. Beitz argues against this alternative by
claiming that the model should be descriptively accurate of current practice and thus
should not be changed unless the practice itself changes. However, this seems to under-
mine any action-guiding function of the model vis-à-vis current practice. In so doing, it
opens the model to the objection of giving «too much authority to the status quo by tak-
ing an existing practice as given» (ibid.), something that Beitz’s arguments aimed to chal-
lenge. For some evidence against the claim that the current human rights practice is exclu-
sively state-centric see Clapham (2006).
38. For a powerful defense along this lines of the negative duty of rich countries to overcome
severe poverty see Pogge (2002) and (2005a). Some of Pogge’s proposals to fulfill this duty
involve distributive measures whereas others do not. In any event, these proposals are an
additional component of his approach that in no way affects the correctness of his norma-
tive analysis.
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left to the uncertain outcome of the negotiated compromises among conflict-
ing ethical-political ideals and interests of the global players, and which deci-
sions must be «depoliticized» and strictly considered a matter of international
justice. Assuming that all economic decisions must by their very nature belong
to the former category seems absolutely wrong to me. But I see no other rea-
son to assume that decisions that call for political intervention in the regula-
tions of the global economic order, instead of calling for military intervention,
automatically fall outside the legitimate mandate of protecting human rights
of the international community and thus cannot be seen as a matter of pre-
venting human rights violations in strict sense. As Habermas indicates in a
recent article, «the General Assembly is the institutional place, among others, for
an inclusive opinion and will formation about the principles of transnational
justice that should guide a global domestic politics» (2007, 450). This claim points
in the direction of the ambitious reading that I mentioned at the beginning.
According to this reading, the standards of transnational justice will be set at
the supranational level by a reformed world organization. These standards would
aim to specify the «fair value» of the human rights recognized to world citizens,
that is, they will spell out «the conditions that need to be guaranteed to world
citizens in view of their respective local contexts so that they can make effec-
tive use of their formally equal rights» (2007, 451). But, as it should be obvious,
a process of opinion and will formation geared towards establishing principles
of transnational justice can guide a global domestic politics only if it has some
impact on it. At the very least, it must be able to rule some policies out and
others in, and this is tantamount to recognizing that it cannot be as neatly cir-
cumscribed as to avoid genuine «political» implications, in Habermas’s sense
of the term. Only if the principles of transnational justice recognized by the
international community are ambitious enough to cover economic justice will they
be able to guide a global domestic politics. However difficult this may be, it is
the very least that cosmopolitans should hope for.
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